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Abstract
The present study investigates the extent to which the effects of entering the la-
bor market in overeducated positions pertrain throughout workers careers. Adopting a
time-to-event modeling approach, we analyze overeducation persistency and evaluate the
existence of state duration dependence. We further investigate future earnings effects
associated with past overeducation employment. Our results report strong entrapment
effects rising from overeducation and for overeducated workers to yield lower returns
for their schooling investment than their equally matched peers. We also conclude the
effects of overeducation to perpetuate to future job allocations, with workers having an
overeducation employment background reported as suffering wage losses ranging from
3.5% to 14%.
Keywords: Overeducation, Duration, State Dependence, Scarring wage effects
I Introduction
For Portugal, the last three decades presented a profound transformation of the educational
system, largely expressed by considerable increases in both participation and completion rates
at secondary and tertiary educational levels (OECD, 2014). Alongside with soaring educa-
tional levels are the concerns over the possible incapacity of the labor market to adjust to the
growing pool of highly educated workers.
The latter fear is supported by a large body of empirical literature for Europe, claiming the
existence of a large share of the labor force alocated into jobs requiring less education than
workers have (overeducated) and for the incidence of the mismatch to be particularly high
for Southern European countries (Boll et al., 2016). For Portugal, explicitly, evidence reveals
nearly 30% of Portuguese workers in the private sector to be overeducated, this percentage
being slighly lower (21%) for newly hired workers (Araújo and Carneiro, 2017).
The educational mismatch has been evidenced to be a costly phenomenon, with overedu-
cated workers reported having lower levels of job satisfaction (Tsang, 1987; Allen and van der
Velden, 2001) and lower returns to their schooling investment (Hartog, 2000). At an aggre-
gate level, overeducation may also describe an inneficient usage of available resources, with
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evidence reporting negative associated effects in terms of short-run developments of the per
capita output (Morgado et al., 2014).
Although the previous effects have been presented as an accurate measure of disadvantage
for overeducated workers, little has been the consideration by the literature on its longitu-
dinal patterns. Nevertheless, for the existent literature covering its dynamics, overeducation
is suggested to scar workers careers, with a large chunk of workers not only to prevail as
overeducated for long periods but also to significantly delay entry into matching employment
by accepting such job positions.
The present study intends to unfold the extent to which the effects of entering the labor
market as overeducated pertrain throughout workers careers. We analyze overeducation per-
sistency, some of its continuance determinants and state duration dependence to characterize
its longitudinal dimension. We further investigate associated earnings effects at entry (wound)
as well as the way these may perpetuate to subsequent job allocations (scar). By doing so,
this study contributes to the Portuguese literature on Overeducation which, to the best of
our knowledge, has concentrated solely on cross-section earnings’ outcomes rising from the
mismatch.
The reminder of this study is organized as follows: section II presents a brief overview of
the literature on overeducation; section III summarizes the developed approaches to measure
overeducation; section IV and V describe the adopted empirical framework together with data
description and definition used to identify overeducated workers; section VI documents the
obtained results and section VII concludes.
II Literature Review
Concerns over a growing pool of overeducated workers ( i.e., having more schooling than nec-
essary for their job ) dates to the late 1970s with Freeman’s (1976) pioneering work on US
graduates. The author argued the excess of US graduates supply to be eventually preceded
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by a slump in college wage premium, shedding out the phenomenon likelihood to persist.
By conceiving an augmented version of the canonical Mincerian earnings equation, the Over-
Required-Under (ORU) model, Duncan and Hoffman (1981) grounded the possibility for es-
timation of earnings effects rising from educational mismatches. Their findings from the 1976
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) reported a 6.3% return to years of education required
for the job, 2.9% for surplus and -4.2% return for deficit years of education. Hence, albeit
having a wage premium over peers at their workplace, overeducated workers were presented
as suffering a wage loss when compared to their peers finding adequate matches.
A myriad of studies have replicated Duncan and Hoffman’s specification using cross-sectional
data, reporting the pay loss to be robust across time, place and employed measure of required
education1. In the overeducation literature for Portugal, Kiker et al. (1997) present similar
results, with a 7.6% return for years of schooling required, 4.8% for surplus and -5.6% for
deficit years of education.
The stylized facts of these cross-sectional data studies were nonetheless criticized by its im-
plicit exogeneity assumption of the mismatch. In other words, if individuals with the same
educational credentials are not perfect substitutes, the assignment into overeducation may be
non-random, compromising the unbiasedness of the OLS earnings estimates. To account for
the latter, in recent years, several authors (e.g. Frenette, 2004; Bauer, 2002) applied panel
data techniques to control for unobservable individual productivity differences, confirming the
OLS return estimates on both over and undereducation years to be downward biased. Nev-
ertheless, and while controversy exists regarding its magnitude, the still observed estimated
earnings loss appears to represent a real measure of disadvantage experienced by overeducated
workers (McGuiness and Pouliakas , 2017).
Yet, what the wage return findings fail to account is the possibility that overeducated workers
may be only temporarily overemployed before switching to a job requiring their schooling
level. In addition, lower unobserved ability, compensating non-pecuniary job amenities and
1See Rumberger, 1987; Sicherman and Galor, 1990; Cohn and Khan, 1995; Daly; Bauer, 2002; Rubb, 2003; Linsley,
2005
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career mobility considerations could rationalize apparent overeducation without necessarily
implying a suboptimal schooling choice (Clark et al. 2014). To fully evaluate how much of a
problem overqualification is, it becomes crucial to analyze its longitudinal dimension.
Sicherman and Galor (1990) and Robst (1995) findings of US overeducated workers experi-
encing higher career mobility in low-skilled jobs than their equally matched peers supported a
frictional view of overeducation, with the authors concluding overeducation to be a stepping
stone towards career upgrading. Their stepping stone hypothesis was nevertheless challenged
by Rubb (2003), which presents substantial persistency in US overschooling by reporting a
meager 20% annual outflow from overeducation into matching positions. By analyzing two
UK graduate cohorts, Battu and Sloane (2000) estimate the educational mismatch to remain
stable at 60% after 11 years since graduation. Buchel (2002) findings for Germany follow sim-
ilar patterns, with overeducated German workers experiencing not only less upward mobility
but also lower relative wage growth rates.
Although mixed, the body of evidence supporting persistency of overeducation seems to largely
outweigh the temporary character hypothesis. On the other hand, and despite its acknowl-
edged importance, evidence on the scarring effects of overeducation over workers careers is
rather scarce.
Mavromaras and McGuiness (2012) estimates from a dynamic random effects probit model
add to the longitudinal mismatch literature by presenting substantial state dependence, the
latter being particularly high for individuals with higher education degrees. Schult and Buchel
(2004) adopt parametric hazard models applied to data from two West German cohorts (1965
and 1971) to test negative occurrence dependence. The authors find individuals accepting
jobs for which they are overeducated not only to significantly reduce their exit likelihood to
matching employment but also be more prone to downward job mobilities.
The extent to which entering an overeducated job accelerates or delays transition into suitable
positions has also been tested by Baert et al. (2013). Employing data from young Flemish
unemployed graduates and adopting a timing of events approach to account for possible non-
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random selection into overeducation, the authors find early overeducation to strongly retard
transitions into adequate positions and for the negative effect to be permanent for both the
short and long-term unemployed graduates.
To disentangle true duration dependence from selection on workers unobservables, Clark et
al. (2014) apply a Mixed Proportional Hazard model on combined data from the 1979 US
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the 1989-1991 waves of the Current Population
Survey. Contrarily to previous findings on scarring overeducation effects, the authors’ findings
suggest the existence of negative duration dependence to be largely explained by individual
unobservable heterogeneity, thereby concluding for the duration of overeducation employment
not to significantly impact workers chances to leave the mismatch state.
III Measuring Overeducation
Educational mismatches arise when completed years of education exceed or fall behind job
required schooling (Sri ).
2 The starting point for identifying the mismatch requires estimation
of schooling years required to perform the job. Literature of over and undereducation has
measured it using either an objective or a subjective approach.
Subjective approaches rely on information provided by workers, either by inquiring the indi-
vidual on his/her job match or to report the educational requirements of the job and indirectly
define it. These have the advantage of being up to date and specific to the job of the respon-
dent. Adversely, a worker’s assessment is inevitably subjective and sensitive to measurement
errors as individuals may overstate educational requirements to inflate their position or to
simply reproduce current hiring standards.
Objective approaches use objective measures such as the educational level of peers working





i −Sri )−max(0, Sri −Sui ), Si as the observed completed years of education, ,Sri schooling years
required for the job, max(0,Soi -S
r







these instructions: the job analysis (JA) and the realized matches (RM) method. The JA
relies on evaluation by professional job analysts who specify the required level of education
for occupational classifications. In the RM method, the observed distribution of workers ed-
ucation at a given occupation is used to assess job qualification requirements, with both the
mean and modal value of each occupational title being used to measure required schooling
years for the job. When the mean is used, the average level of education of a given occupation
is defined as the required schooling level for that occupation, with the individual classified
as overeducated if his/her level of education exceeds the average by at least one standard
deviation . In alternative, the required schooling level in a given occupation has been also
determined as the mode of the completed schooling levels of people working in that job, with
an overeducated worker being the one with a higher education than the mode.
Although the job analysis is conceptually superior due to its explicit objectivity, it constructs
on the assumption that jobs within the same occupational classification have equivalent job
requirements and, its costly and timely implementation, makes it likely to quickly become
obsolete. The realized matches method has the advantage of being always available as it is
directly computed from data. Yet, it contains observations on the equilibrium realized by
demand and supply forces, thus already reflecting the allocation outcome of an assignment
model. Furthermore, it may be sensitive to cohort effects, its design arbitrary and will gener-
ally find symmetry on the incidences over the types of mismatch (Hartog, 2000).
Altogether, the aforementioned methods convey advantages and disadvantages, and, to the
best of our knowledge, no optimal methodology has been developed so far. The role of avail-
ability of data in determining the preferability of one measure over the other is discussed by
Hartog (2000): “You use what is available”.
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IV Empirical Framework
On this section we heavily rely on Jenkins’ (1999) contributions to survival analysis to in-
vestigate overeducation persistency and to model the effect of duration in an overeducated
position on the length of time until departure from overeducation and to two possible destina-
tion routes. We start by introducing the taxonomy used in the survival literature and follow
with the adopted approach.
Let T be a non-negative random variable representing the individual elapsed time until de-
parture from an overeducated employment spell, with a cumulative distribution function F (t)
and probability density function f(t).
The cumulative distribution function is known in the survival literature as the failure function
and returns the probability that an overeducation employment spell has occurred by duration
t: F (t) = Pr(T ≤ t), with t the elapsed time since entry to an overeducated employment spell
at time 0. The complement of the failure function is the survival function, summarizing the
probability of remaining in an overeducated employment spell just before duration t or, in an
analogous manner, the probability that an overeducated employment spell has not ended by
duration t: S(t) = Pr(T ≥ t) = 1− F (t).
The slope of the failure function F (t) is the probability density function f(t), which returns
the (unconditional) probability of an individual having an overeducation employment spell of
length exactly t or the ‘probability’ that an individual will leave an overeducated employment
spell in an infinitesimal interval of time ∆t:
lim
∆t→0







An useful characterization of the distribution of T is given by the hazard function h(t). Applied
to the present context, the difference between the probability density and the hazard function
results from the former presenting the concentration of departures from an overeducated
employment spell at each instant of time whereas the latter summarizes the same concentration
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but conditioning this on survival in overeducation up to that moment in time. The probability
density function may then be thought as returning an instantaneous rate of departure whereas
the hazard function describes a conditional one, thereby accounting the possibility for the rate
of departure from an overeducated employment spell to keep changing with permanency in
that state.
Formally, in continuous time, the hazard function is described as: 3
h(t) = lim
∆t→0





The numerator from above presents the probability for an overeducated employment spell to
end in the interval [t, t + ∆t], given that it has not ended before, and the denominator the
width of that interval. Dividing one by the other and taking the limit as the width goes down
to zero yields the rate of overeducated employment departures at each instant in time. The
hazard out of overeducation may be then interpreted as the instantaneous risk of exit for each
individual at each t.
Although the underlying survival process is continuous in time, our data time intervals are
partitioned into unit lengths, years. The interval boundaries are the positive integers j =
1,2,3,4,. . . , with each given interval j being (T0, T1], (T1, T2], . . . , (Tj−1,∞[ . The data is ob-
served on a discrete basis, with T ∈ (1, 2, 3, . . . , j), and T = t representing an exit from
overeducation during (Tt−1, Tt] .The latter grounds the choice of discrete time hazard models
followed by the current analysis.
To model the instantaneous risk of exit from overeducation, the hazard out of overeducation,
we resort to the discrete proportional hazard model, accounting for the presence of a vector of
3The relationship between the hazard h(t) and both the density f(t) and the survival S(t) function may be derived
using Baye’s rule. The conditional numerator in the limit expression may be defined as the ratio of the joint probability
that T lies in [t, t + ∆t] and T ≥ t to the probability that T ≥ t. The former may be written as f(t)∆t for small
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covariates that may affect the time spent in that state. The hazard at time t for an individual
with covariates Xi equals the product of a baseline hazard function h0(t), describing the risk
for individuals with Xi = 0, and the relative risk exp(Xiβ), presenting the proportionate
increase/decrease in the probability of leaving an overeducation position associated with the
set of attributes Xi.
The estimation of the log likelihood function requires the choice of the functional form of
the discrete hazard. The aforementioned nature of data implies the appropriate form of the
hazard out of overeducation employment to be the complementary log-log functional form
(Prentice and Gloeckler,1978):
hi(t|Xi) = 1− [1− h0(t)]exp(Xiβ)
With the aim of analyzing the existence of duration dependence, we further extend the latter
by including as additional covariate λ(t), the natural logarithm of overeducation duration,
capturing the elasticity of departure from an overeducated position with respect to elapsed
duration in that state:
hi(t|Xi) = 1− [1− h0(t)]exp(λ(t) +Xiβ) (1)
Following the model in equation one, the hazard out of overeducation employment depends on
the time spent (in years) as overeducated, captured by λ(t), as well as on a set of individual
covariates . We estimate the latter with no assumption on the distribution of the baseline
hazard as to avoiding misspecification problems of choosing its wrong shape.
Hazard estimates from model of equation (1) can be significantly biased if unobserved individ-
ual heterogeneity (UIH) is not considered (Lancaster, 1979). Controlling only for observable
differences, individuals with unobserved characteristics vi (i.e. motivation, ability, family
background) associated with higher exit rates leave overeducation faster. Consequently, for
higher durations, the pool of survivors becomes increasingly composed of overeducated work-
ers whose unobserved attributes are associated with lower exit rates (lower hazards). Thence,
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any (positive) negative overeducation duration dependence will be (under)overestimated.
To handle UIH we follow Heckman and Singer’s (1984) mass-point approach, accounting for
an arbitrary distribution for individual heterogeneity by assuming each worker to belong to
one of a number of different types z = 1 . . . , z, identified from their variation in duration
conditional on observed characteristics . We accomodate the presence of two different types
of overeducated workers , differing between themselves in unobserved characteristics affecting
transitions out of overeducated positions. Although membership of each type is unobserved,
the resulting hazard function incorporates an additional term (mtype), allowing for its intercept
to vary with the different estimated heterogeneity type:
h(t|Xi) = 1− [1− h0(t)]exp(mtype + λ(t) +Xiβ) (2)
with mtype=1 normalized to zero and mass point 2 equal to mtype=2 + β0.
We further replicate the previous specifications to assess the effect of overeducation employ-
ment on the hazard out to two specific destination routes: matching or underschooling posi-
tions.
With the aim of increasing our alertness over the scaring effects from overeducation employ-
ment throughout workers careers, we further extend our analysis to identify possible scarring
wage effects from previous overeducation positions and how these may change with the time
spent by the individual as overeducated.
By identifying individuals making the transition out of overeducation positions, we estimate
an augmented version of Duncan and Hoffman’s (1981) log-wage specification by introducing
as explanatory variables lags of previous overeducation duration:






i + δαDur + εi
with log(witj) the natural logarithm of hourly earnings, xi containing individual covariates, S
r
i
years of required education for the job, Soi years of overeducation, S
u
i years of undereducation
and Dur identifying duration from previous overeducation employment.
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V Data Description and identification of overeducation
V.I Quadros de Pessoal (QP)
Our analysis is based on data collected from 1986 to 2013 in Quadros de Pessoal (QP), a longi-
tudinal matched employer-employee-job title data set. Data are collected in October of every
year by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor and Social Solidarity, covering all establishments
with at least one wage earner. The mandatory status of the survey enhances data quality
by mitigating problems commonly associated with panel data (i.e attrition or measurement
error). Detailed information at worker (i.e. earnings, occupation, tenure, work schedule,
gender, education), firm (i.e. number of workers, main economic activity (CAE), location,
legal status, turnover) and affiliated establishments (location, economic activity, employment,
sales) is available.
At QP, each worker and firm in the data base is assigned with a unique identifying number.
A unique feature of QP derives from the availability of data on collective wage agreements,
such that each worker is assigned in each year to a specific job title and the corresponding
collective agreement. The unusual richness of data allows us to track individuals over the
years and to match them with firms, collective agreement and job tittle held in each year.
V.II Identifying Overeducated workers
The design of QP allows for identification of overeducation only through objective approaches.
We resort to the realized matches (RM) approach and follow Kiker et al. (1997) on using the
observed modal value of education to determine the required level of schooling for a given
job title. Although the underlying choice between the mean and the modal value on the RM
approach relies on some degree of arbitrariness, the mode is generally preferred by being less
vulnerable to outliers and technological changes (Meroni et al. 2016). In addition, QP col-
lects information regarding the collective agreement ruling the wage dimension of the match
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between employer and employee.
The availability of the specific job tittle held by the worker, within each collective agreement,
allows for refinement from the broad classification of occupations traditionally used by studies
applying RM. The former translates into an elevated level of disaggregation, such that simi-
lar occupations are considered as distinct job titles if their wages are settled within different
collective agreements (Portugal et al. 2016).4 The employed required schooling level is deter-
mined as the mode of the distribution of education amongst individuals working in a given
job tittle, in each year. An individual is thus identified as overeducated if his/her educational
diploma exceeds the observed distributional education mode of his/her job tittle on a specific
year.
To estimate the impact of elapsed overeducation duration at job entry level on the hazard
out of overeducation and on the transition into matching and underschooling employment, a
set of restraints to the initial data were made. First, the sample was restricted to those indi-
viduals entering QP for the first time. An additional control, defined by individuals having
a reported lower than 12 months of tenure, was set to excise individuals entering QP for the
first time without being first job entries. Workers with higher than 30 years of tenure and
those working in Agriculture, Fishery and Mining sectors were also excluded. At least, only
individuals entering the labor market for the first time as overeducated were analyzed and
followed over time.
The final sample for our first model (no destination route specified) is composed by 1,647,281
entry-level overeducated workers and 347,178 firms. From these, 862,248 (52%) remained in
overeducation positions throughout our 27-year period of analysis. The estimation of the haz-
ard out to the two aforementioned destination routes was performed by restricting the initial
sample to those leaving an overeducation employment spell to each of the destination types.
4For instance, within QP a secretary in the financial services industry has a distinct job title from a secretary in
the textile industry. Under the traditional broad classification (i.e. ISCED 1997 3-digit occupational level), both job
titles would be considered as belonging to the same occupational group, resulting most likely in erroneous assessments
about the mismatch. One expects the two different job titles to require distinct levels of education due to the distinct
complexity of tasks performed. The latter effect is captured by the present study using the modal level for each job
tittle, in each year, under a specific collective agreement.
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Here, the final sample is composed by 785,033 individuals, where 73% left overeducation into
a matching position and 27% entered underschooling employment.
The average age for the overeducated worker is 31 years and nearly half has either upper sec-
ondary or tertiary educational levels. Heterogeneity is found regarding the amount of years
spent in overeducated positions (between 1 up to 26 years), with higher permanence observed
for individuals with higher diplomas.
Even if no sizeable differences are found with respect to gender overeducation incidence
(57% males and 43% females), the gender distribution across sectors of activity is rather
despair, with overeducated male workers being majorly allocated across construction and
freight-transport activities and women into manufacturing, hospitality or retail super and
hypermarkets jobs.
VI Empirical Results
VI.I Longer stay, harsh leave?
Figure 1. reports the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier Survival function of yearly transitions out
of overeducation.
Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Survival Function
Source : Quadros de Pessoal (Author’s calculations)
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One year after entry, the probability for an individual to remain in an overeducated position
falls sharply to nearly 50%. The median duration until exit from overeducation lies beneath
2 years and although the majority of workers leave 5 years since entry, each additional year
spent as overeducated yield minor increases on the probability of exiting the mismatch status,
suggesting the likelihood to leave overeducation to be decreasing with overeducation continu-
ance.
Despite consistent with negative duration dependence, this pattern could also result from the
presence of individual permanent heterogeneity correlated with the hazard out of that state,
hence limiting any causality assessment to be based on the former simple descriptive depiction.
To assess the role of individual and firm features on driving overeducation persistence, as well
as to test for the possibility of negative duration dependence, the estimation of equations (1)
and (2) was performed. The Model of equation (2) accounts for the possibility of two UIH
types to be present, allowing to disentangle between “true” and spurious duration dependence.
The selected covariates age, gender, firm size and a nationality dummy variable, with value 1
if the individual is born in Portugal and 0 otherwise, allow us to replicate already established
longitudinal career patterns of overeducation employment for the Portuguese context.
The corresponding model estimates are presented in Table 1. The negative coefficient on age
suggests older workers to experience higher persistence of overeducation employment. The
negative relationship between exit likelihood and age may follow from the expected positive
correlation between age and job tenure, with older workers higher accumulation of firm-specific
human capital investments producing strong “lock-in” effects into bad positions (Pissarides,
1994).
The hazard out overeducation is 5% higher for males when compared to females. The manful-
advantage in exiting overeducation employment may relate to the literature findings reporting
higher overschooling prevalence for females. The latter could be the result of women placing
more value on non-pecuniary job amenities associated with low-requirement jobs (i.e. flexibil-
ity of hours worked) or reflect labor market gender discrimination by employers. In addition,
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Table I. Hazard out of Overeducation
Equation (1) corresponds to the model not controlling for UIH and model of
equation (2) to the mass-point approach specification. The former accounts for
the effect of individual unobserved permanent heterogeneity on duration by
allowing the presence of distinct worker types, identified from variation in
duration conditional on observed characteristics.
as proposed by Frank (1978), women’s higher overeducation persistence could also mirror the
fact that, in dual earner households where men are the prime income source, women’s labor
choice location is subdued to the husband’s labor market prospects. Given the weight placed
by the literature on the link between overeducation persistence and spatial factors, the for-
mer could substantiate our findings of women’s higher prospects to remain in a mismatching
position 5.
The transition process out of overeducation employment is slightly higher for the native pop-
ulation. Being born in Portugal increases one individual’s exit likelihood by roughly 2%,
5See McGoldrick and Robst (1996) and Buchel and van Ham (2000)
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ceteris paribus. Although we cannot ascertain from our data on whether foreign individuals
have acquired formal schooling outside Portugal, several premises can be placed to explain
these results. The higher mismatch persistence for foreign workers could be explained by their
shortage of specific labor market rewarded human capital characteristics (i.e. proficiency in
the native language). This is also in line with literature findings of higher overeducation preva-
lence for immigrants, whom accordingly substitute their lack of native labor market valued
attributes with higher educational credentials. The former findings may also be grounded
on labor market discrimination, even though one must be careful on claiming discrimination
per se. Employers may prefer to recruit national workers based on their superior knowledge
about the average quality of nationally educated workers, henceforth increasing the tendency
of confounding recruitment-based discrimination with imperfect information (Nielsen, 2007).
The size of the firm appears to strongly impact the exit likelihood of overeducated workers,
with those entering overeducated positions in larger firms being less likely to leave. Larger
firms are acknowledged to possess well-defined job ladders, internal job-upgrades and promo-
tions based on seniority (Fairris, 2004). The existence of such internal labor market mech-
anisms, allowing long-term advancement opportunities within the firm, may provide an in-
centive for workers to remain in mismatched positions. In addition, the former may also
find explanation on larger firms having higher fringe benefits (Edmiston, 2007).The lower exit
likelihood from overeducated positions in larger firms may then reflect workers preferences for
these non-pecuniary amenities, in resemblance to findings reporting workers accepting low-
paid jobs in exchange for larger benefits (Olson, 2002).
Referring to the estimate of interest for measuring state dependence, log(t), the results from
both model equations (1) and (2) report the elasticity of exiting overeducation employment
with respect to elapsed duration to be negative and statistically significant, in support of
negative duration dependence. Controlling for UIH in specification (2) significantly decreases
the elasticity estimate, indicating part of the negative duration dependence in the model of
equation (1) to be attributable to selection on unobservables. Nevertheless, and even control-
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ling for permanent heterogeneity, the reported estimate underlines the prevalence of negative
state dependence, with a 10% increase in time spent as overeducated decreasing one worker’s
exit likelihood in 3.9%.
The mass-point approach model of equation (2) accomodates the presence of two distinct types
of workers, with markedly different overeducation dynamics. The majority of overeducated
workers are identified as belonging to Type II (70%), whereas 30% is identified as being a Type
I. The higher intercept for Type II indicates the hazard for this type to be higher than that
of Type I, other things being equal. In other words, the latter suggests the majority of the
overeducated work force (70%) to leave overeducation employment in a faster way relatively
to Type I people.
The significant difference between the hazards of the two UIH mass-points suggests overedu-
cation to follow distinct mechanisms for each type.
The high exit rates for Type II overeducated workers is consistent with a temporary view of
overeducation. Accordingly, overeducation employment may result from a sluggish adjustment
of firm processes to the available workforce or to exist only as long as it takes for workers to
find an appropriate match (Alba-Ramirez, 1993). The decision to become temporarily overe-
ducated may also mimic one individual’s human capital investment strategy, whereby he/she
would accept an overeducated job as to acquire the necessary on-the-job experience before
upgrading into a matching position (Sicherman and Galor, 1990).
For the remaining, low-hazard, 30% overeducated workers, it could be that their ability is not
sufficient for jobs that match their level of formal schooling, averting the upgrading transition
to take place (Clark et al. 2014).
In what follows we analyze the results if considering the possibility out to two distinct exits,
with Figure 2. reporting the corresponding Kaplan-Meier survival estimates.
The median duration until exit out of overeducation into a matching position is 5 years
(right figure). On the left side of Figure 2., we consider exits from overeducation into under-
schooling job positions. This may characterize, as an example, a post-secondary non-tertiary
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Figure 2: Kaplan-Meier Survival Function by destination type
Source : Quadros de Pessoal (Author’s calculations)
female working as a cashier at a retail store upgrading her position into a managerial one
,where the modal value of education is a college degree. At the defined duration interval, the
corresponding survival function does not converge to zero but assumes and maintains some
positive value. This might possibly represent a situation in which the risk of exiting to that
destination is defective. Expressed in another way, when considering departure to that spe-
cific route, we may find overeducated workers with a non-zero probability of ending up in an
overeducated employment spell which lasts forever (Addison and Portugal, 2003).
Failure to implement the mass point approach model controlling for UIH for the two exit
destinations indicates inability to differentiate between distinct types of individuals making
the transition to each of the states. In other words, the sort of individuals exiting overeduca-
tion into adequate employment/underschooling employment is homogeneous with respect to
unobservable behavior affecting the transitions into that state.
The hazard estimates for the two exit routes are presented in Table II. Adversely to the for-
mer hazard results, and those considering exit into matching positions, the positive coefficient
on age in the specification considering exit into underschooling suggest older workers to enjoy
higher changeovers when this destination is considered. The transition from overeducation
into underschooling positions might possibilly characterize the labor market, either internal
or external, compensating older workers experience for the lack of required formal schooling,
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Table II.Hazard out to Matching or Underschooling employment
Model (1) and Model (2) correspond to the hazard estimate out of overeducation
into matching and underschooling positions, respectively, estimated using the
complementary log-log functional form. The used sample comprehends only
individuals who have left overeducation into each of these positions, ruling out
re-entries into overeducation.
endorsing this boundary upgrading of job positions to occur.
Whichever mechanism favors the Portuguese nationality on the hazard out of overeducation,
it appears to reverse when considering exit into underschooling positions, with foreign-born
individuals presenting a 6% higher exit likelihood than those born in Portugal, ceteris paribus.
For the reminder covariates, their effect is in line with those obtained in previous specifica-
tions, irrespectively on the destination venue.
The reported elasticity estimate hints a more severe negative duration dependence effect from
overeducation employment for the two havens, with a 10% increase in duration reducing the
exit likelihood, either to an under or matching position, by more than 9%. This stronger
reported negative duration dependence effect may nevertheless translate the inability to con-
trol for different UIH types, with individuals remaining as overeducated for longer durations
inducing an overestimation of the duration dependence effect.
20
VI.II Wage effects from overeducation employment : Wounds and
Scars
In what follows, we address our pooled OLS estimates as in Duncan and Hoffman’s (1981)
log-wage equation (ORU Model), allowing for the estimation of separate wage returns for
years of school required for the job, surplus and deficit years:







where witj denotes hourly earnings for individual i in year t in job title j, S
r
i years of required
education for the job, Soi years of overeducation, S
u
i years of undereducation, xi a vector of
individual control variables and εi the error term.
An augmented wage regression identifying past overeducation spells is also presented as to
test for the existence of scarring wage effects of previous overeducation employment.6
Unlike our previous analysis, the employed sample for the log-wage regressions included not
only those starting the career as overeducated but also those entering matching and under-
schooling positions. These are included as to properly identify the returns for required, over
and undereducation years. To disentangle between the wage effects of being on a still ongoing
overeducation spell from those of past overeducation employment, individuals on a continuing
overeducation spell were excised from the sample.
In Table III, ORU estimates for the separate earnings returns are consistent with those
reported on Portugal by Kiker et al. (1997). In other words, when compared to co-workers
who have just the required education to perform the job, the average overeducated Portuguese
worker yields a 4.7 % return for the extra year of schooling above the required. Adversely,
and relative to co-workers who have the required education, for undereducated workers each
year of undereducation translates into an earnings loss of nearly 7%. Hitherto, and even if de-
livering economic value, each year of overeducation yields only half of the return of those just
6For the estimation of the two log-wage regressions we assume the error term εi to be cross-sectionally and serially
independent, with zero mean and constant variance.
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Table III. Scarring wage effects of overeducation employment
The sample for both specifications consists of individual yearly observations from
1986 to 2013. Both specifications correspond to the pooled OLS estimates of
Duncan and Hoffmans log-wage regression, with the augmented wage specification
including lags of past overeducation duration as covariates. For the latter, only
individuals who experienced before but terminated an overeducation employment
spell were considered.
required for the job (9.8%), indicating overeducated workers to earn less than their equally
educated peers who find adequate matches. The remaining covariates present the expected
effects, with a gender wage gap of nearly 30% and a positive return on experience (as proxied
by age) and on job seniority.
Noticeably, the results from the augmented wage regression reveal persistent and statistically
significant current wage penalties associated with past overeducation employment. The height
of the effect increases substantially with duration in overeducation, with a current estimated
pay loss of 3.5% for individuals with 2-year and of 14% for those with a 10-year overeducation
employment background.
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Distinct hypotheses can be offered to unveil the rationale ruling out a negative association
between overeducation and future wages. First, overeducation employment may represent a
period of skills underutilization. It is possible for individuals to suffer deterioration of their
human capital whilst working as overeducated (de Grip et al., 2008), and for the magnitude
of depreciation to increase with duration in that state. Thence, the individual’s marginal
product, determined by his/her level of accumulated human capital, will continuously decline
with overeducation duration. If workers are paid according to their marginal product (Becker,
1964), the reported pay losses are entirely consistent with the Human Capital view of the
labor market.
The same reasoning could apply if overeducated workers are less productive per se and thus,
even by changing into matching positions, employers will tend to pay them less (Groot, 1996).
Therefore, to the extent that individuals who remain overeducated for longer are also the less
able ones, the reported scarring wage effects may reflect the inability to control for residual
unobserved ability components. If this is the case, then caution shall be exercised when inter-
preting the former wage effects in the standard manner, as they may suffer from the classic
omitted variable bias.
Lower future wages for previously overeducated workers could nevertheless derive from stigma-
tization from employers. In similarity to the hiring model explored in Blanchard and Diamond
(1994) for jobless duration, employers may rank employees on the recruitment process consid-
ering their overeducation duration. Higher durations may thus signal lower productivity or
other unobservable undesirable features for prospective employers, shedding light on both our
estimated scarring wage effects and also on our previous findings of higher durations delaying
transitions into proper matches.
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VII Conclusions
The present study combines data from a longitudinal matched employer-employee-job title
data set to investigate the existence of scarring effects of overeducation employment along
workers careers. Targeting first-job entries into overeducated positions, we analyze its persis-
tence, examine the existence of negative duration dependence as well as associated entry and
future wage effects.
Although nearly half of workers exit overeducation into a matching position 5 years after
entry, the estimation of a mass-point approach hazard model identified two distinct types of
overeducated workers. The mismatch appears to follow different mechanisms for both types,
with overeducation employment expected to be long-lasting for nearly 30% of the overedu-
cated population.
Men are found to leave overeducation positions quickly than women and the exit advantage
is extended to workers born in Portugal. Older workers are unfavored in the hazard out of
overeducation, presenting higher odds of having enlarged periods in that state.
The exit elasticity estimate with respect to elapsed duration is found negative and statistically
significant, grounding the existence of negative state duration dependence. Overeducation ap-
pears as a trap and this effect is estimated as even harsh when considering matching positions
as the destination venue, with a 10% increase in overeducation duration associated with a
higher than 9% lower exit likelihood.
Estimation of separate wage returns for required, surplus and deficit years of schooling, reveals
workers entering overeducation to yield nearly half of the return (4.7%) for their schooling
investment than their equally educated peers located in matching positions. Extending the
log-wage specification to include duration of previous overeducation employment, we observe
not only overeducated workers to suffer a pay loss at entry but also to have significant future
wage penalties associated with past employment on that state. The height of the scarring
wage effect increases with elapsed duration, with an estimated pay penalty ranging between
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3.5% up to 14 % for a 2-year and 10-year overeducation background, respectively.
The latter findings bear similarity to those reported to accompany prolonged unemployment
spells and may relate to the findings of McGormick (1990) and Verhaest & Baert (2014) on
overeducated workers to be stigmatized and for overeducation to provide an even stronger
negative signal to prospective employers than unemployment.
In sum, entering overeducated positions may translate into a trap for a considerable portion
of workers. We find overeducation as a disadvantageous form of employment, with overedu-
cated workers not only suffering a pay loss by entering into such positions but for its effects
to perpetuate to subsequent job allocations, with past overeducated employment associated
with significant future earning losses.
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Appendix
Appendix I. Overeducation incidence by Sectors of activity (left) and District location (right)
Appendix II. Distribution of completed years of education of entry-level overeducated workers
28
Appendix III. Distribution of completed years of schooling of individuals who leave and those remain-
ing as overeducated (left) and for those who leave by destination route (right)
Appendix IV. Duration in overeducated positions, by school diploma
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